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proper grounds for which evidence of 
subsequent conduct should be admitted. 
Id. 
Finally, the Wilson court was careful to 
reconcile its holding with the federal rule 
on subsequent remedial measures. The 
federal rule reasonably restricts the ad-
missibility of such evidence to those situ-
ations where needed; that is, "when of-
fered for another purpose such as pro-
viding ownership, control or feasibility 
of precautionary measures, if contro-
verted, or impeachment." Fed. R. Evid. 
407. However, the court pointed outthat 
the advisory committee's note to Federal 
Rule 407 expressly lists "existence of 
duty" as a valid basis for admitting evi-
dence of subsequent remedial measures. 
Wilson, 317 Md. at 297 n.8, 563 A.2d 405 
n.8. Thus, the court restated the prin-
ciple that evidence of subsequent con-
duct should not be received as an admis-
sion of negligence or liability, but that the 
standard of care exception is Maryland 
law.ld. at 300-01, 563 A.2d at 400. 
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that evidence of prior and 
subsequent hospital practices were rele-
vant and admissible to prove the alleged 
breach ofthe applicable standard of care. 
In addition, the court provided a test to 
determine admissibility of such prior 
evidence. However, the danger inherent 
in following the Wilson standard is that 
the allowability of prior or subsequent 
evidence could provide indirect proof of 
causation, or in effect, the exception 
could "swallow the [general] rule" pro-
hibiting the admission of such evidence. 
Id. at 300,563 A.2d at 400 (quoting 5 L. 
McLain, Maryland Practice: Maryland 
Evidence § 407.1 (1987, 1989 Supp.». 
Consequently, to allow both prior and 
subsequent evidence might make such 
evidence tantamount to an admission of 
negligence, which the court of appeals 
has expressly precluded. 
-Stephen E. Cohill 
Andresen v. Andresen: MARYlAND 
COURTS NOT PERMITfED TO 
REDETERMINE MARITAL PROPERlY 
MORE THAN 30 DAYS AFfER FINAL 
DIVORCE DECREE 
In Andresen v. Andresen, 317 Md. 380, 
564 A.2d 399 (1989), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland considered the power 
of a court to modify a 1981 divorce de-
cree, which would have allowed a former 
spouse to share her former husband's 
military pension. The court held that the 
petitioner had not established any 
grounds upon which the trial court's 
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final judgment could have been 
reexamined.ld. at 391, 564 A.2d at 405. 
The court reasoned that there was no 
authority under Maryland law which al-
lowed a court to redetermine marital 
property more than thirty days after the 
decree became final except in cases of 
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical 
errors.ld. at 387,564 A.2d at 403. Thus, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland af-
firmed the trial court's ruling. 
Ruth and Ralph Andresen were di-
vorced in Maryland on November 13, 
1981. The divorce decree provided for 
alimony and payment of attorney's fees 
but did not include sharing Mr. Andre-
sen's military pension benefits, which at 
that time could not have been subjected 
to division upon divorce according to 
federal law. 
On March 12, 1986, Ms. Andresen filed 
a motion in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County to modify the 1981 
divorce decree to allow her to share Mr. 
Andresen's military pension. Because 
Ms. Andresen's motion failed to specify 
the procedural mechanism by which a 
court could reopen the four-year-old 
divorce decree, Mr. Andresen's motion 
to dismiss was granted. Ms. Andresen 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari prior to a 
decision by the intermediate appellate 
court to consider whether Mr. Andre-
sen's motion to dismiss was properly 
granted. On appeal, Ms. Andresen ar-
gued that the changes in the law consti-
tuted sufficient justification to reopen 
the enrolled divorce decree to allow 
sharing of Mr. Andresen's military pen-
sion benefits. Id. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401. 
The court of appeals began its discus-
sion of the applicable law by reviewing 
the changes in federal law. "On June 26, 
1981, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that, as matter of federal law, courts 
could not subject military retirement pay 
to division upon divorce." Id. at 382,564 
A.2d at 400 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 
453 U.S. 210 (1981». After the Andre-
sen's divorce became final in 1981, fed-
eral statutory law changed thereby allow-
ing courts to consider military pensions 
as marital assets for distribution in di-
vorce proceedings.ld. In response to the 
McCarty deCision, Congress enacted the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' 
Protection Act (USFSPA) on September 
8, 1982, effective February 1, 1983. The 
Act was codified in pertinent part as 10 
U.S.CA. § 1408 (c) (1). The USFSPA pro-
vided: 
Subject to the limitations of this 
section, a court may treat disposable 
retired or retainer pay payable to a 
[ service] member for pay periods 
beginning after June 25, 1981, ei-
ther as property solely of the mem-
ber or as property of the member 
and his spouse in accordance with 
the law of the jurisdiction of such 
court. 
317 Md. at 383, 564 A.2d at 401. 
The court noted that the purpose of 
the USFSPA was to overrule the McCarty 
decision thereby allowing state law to 
determine whether military pensions 
were marital property. Id. at 384, 564 
A.2d at 401. In addition, the court exam-
ined the legislative history which re-
vealed that the USFSPA was retroactive 
and allowed divorce decrees entered 
between the date of the McCarty deci-
sion and the effective date of the USFSPA 
to be reopened. Id. 
Furthermore, the court noted that 
under Maryland law, as construed in 
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 
A.2d 883 (1981), pensions, including 
military pensions were marital property. 
In addition, the Maryland General As-
sembly had confirmed, as now codified in 
the Family Law Article, that a military 
pension shall be considered as any other 
pension or retirement benefit. Md. Fam. 
Law Code Ann. § 8-203(b) (1984). 
Pursuant to the USFSPA, the court 
found approximately thirty-five state 
courts had reopened divorce decrees. 
However, these jurisdictions followed 
Federal Rule 60(b)(5) and/or 60 (b) (6), 
which allowed post-final judgment relief. 
317 Md. at 386,564 A.2d at 402. Addi-
tionally, it was found that eight states 
reserved equity or other broad powers to 
reviseafinaljudgment. Id. at 386-87, 564 
A.2d at 403. Although the majority of 
courts had reopened finalized divorce 
derees to permit a former spouse to 
share military pension proceeds, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
Maryland law did not allow a Maryland 
court to reopen a divorce decree, which 
had been enrolled for more than thirty 
days, except as provided by Maryland 
Rule 2-535. Id. at 387, 564 A.2d at 403. 
In support of its decision, the court of 
appeals reiterated its earlier decision in 
Platt v. Platt, 302 Md. 9, 485 A.2d 250 
(1984), where it had held that the trial 
court lacked the power to revise a five-
year-old divorce decree. Andresen 317 
Md. at 388, 564 A.2d at 403. In Platt, the 
court had emphasized that there was no 
authority under Maryland law which 
would allow a re-examination of marital 
property distribution thirty days after the 
decree became enrolled, except for 
fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical 
error.ld. 
The court recognized that because 
there were other states that did not per-
mit trial courts to reopen final divorce 
decrees, Congress could not have in-
tended the USFSPA to override state law, 
even though Congress clearly intended 
USFSPA to be retroactive. Id. at 390-91, 
564 A.2d 404-05. Although the legislative 
history of the USFSPA disclosed that final 
judgments could be reopened, the court 
reasoned that this disclosure merely re-
flected Congress' awareness that the law 
in the majority of states allowed a reo-
pening of final judgments. Id. "On the 
other hand," the court stated, "there is 
nothing in the legislative history demon-
strating that Congress intended to 
preempt state procedural law setting 
forth the grounds for reopening a final 
judgment." Id. at 391,564 A.2d at 405. 
Despite the USFSPA, military spouses 
divorced in Maryland between the pe-
riod of the McCarty decision, June 26, 
1981, and the effective date of the 
USFSPA, February 1, 1983, were dealt a 
severe blow by the Andresen decision. 
According to Maryland law, a court can-
not redetermine marital property more 
than thirty days after a divorce decree be-
comes final. Thus, the decision in Andre-
sen demonstrated that nothing short of 
fraud, mistake, irregularity, or clerical 
error can justifY the reopening of a final 
divorce decree. 
-Ellen W. Cohill 
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith: 
MARYlAND'S CAP ON 
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 
RENDERED CONSTITUTIONAL IN 
WRONGFUL DEAm ACTIONS 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in Potomac Elec. Power Company 
v. Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768 
(1989), held that Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. section 11-108 (1989), a stat-
ute placing a cap on noneconomic dam-
ages, is constitutional as applied to a 
wrongful death action. Although the 
Maryland cap was found constitutional 
in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland, the Maryland courts 
had not yet addressed the issue. 
Fifteen year old Chrisianthia Lambert 
was electrocuted by a downed power line 
owned and maintained by the Potomac 
Electric Power Company ("PEPCO"). The 
wire was hanging two or three feet above 
a footpath that cut through a PEP CO 
right-of-way. PEPCO had knowledge that 
the footpath was regularly used by both 
adults and children. Prior to the inCident, 
the wire had been held up by a cross arm 
attached to a utility pole. When one side 
of the cross arm snapped off, PEPCO, in 
violation of a statute, placed the wire on 
the other side of the cross arm. This 
second side eventually broke, resulting 
in the downed wire. Over a one month 
span, PEPCO had been warned on three 
separate occasions that the wire was 
down; yet, no corrective action was 
taken. Lambert was walking along the 
footpath when she came in contact with 
the downed wire. She died instantly as 
7,600 volts of electricity were sent 
through her body. 
Pursuant to their action for wrongful 
death, a jury awarded Lambert's parents, 
Doris Smith and George Lambert, 
$500,000 in compensatory damages and 
$7,500,000 in punitive damages. The 
judge then reduced the award of com-
pensatory damages to $350,000, the cap 
on noneconomic damages, set by section 
11-108(b). Noneconomic damages in-
clude pain, suffering, inconvenience, 
physical impairment, loss of consortium, 
but do not include punitive damages. 
Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. CodeAnn. § 11-108 
(1989). Both parents appealed the re-
duction. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land began its analysis of the cap by 
affirming the trial court's application of 
the cap to wrongful death actions. Id. at 
623, 558 A.2d at 785. After discussing 
the legislative history and purposes of the 
statute, the court reasoned that the appli-
cation effectuates the legislative intent in 
alleviating the liability/insurance crisis by 
limiting certain damage awards to 
$350,000. Id. at 623, 558 A.2d at 784. 
'The fact that the cap does not expressly 
enumerate the types of personal injury 
actions within its ambit is a function of its 
breadth, not a limitation of its 
application." Id. 
The court then turned to the issues of 
whether the cap violated various por-
tions of the United States Constitution as 
well as the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. Specifically, the parents argued 
that the cap violated their rights to a jury 
trial, due process and equal protection 
under the law. The court, after analyzing 
each issue, determined that the statute 
did not violate either the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights or the United States 
Constitution.ld. at 625-35, 558 A.2d at 
786-96. 
The parents contended that the appli-
cation of the cap "invades the fact-finding 
province of the jury by restricting its 
ability to determine and fully assess 
damages." Id. at 626, 558 A.2d at 786. 
The court disagreed, stating that the 
wrongful death action is a statutory crea-
tion, and, as such, the legislature may 
limit and condition awards under such 
an action. /d. at 628, 558 A.2d at 787. 
Next, the parents contended that a 
plaintiff whose recovery is so limited is 
denied access to the court and a full 
remedy at law because there are no alter-
native remedies to recover the full 
amount of the injury. Id. In dismissing 
this claim, the court reasoned that even 
with this cap, wrongful death beneficiar-
ies are entitled to a greater remedy than 
proVided prior to the enactment of the 
statute permitting wrongful death ac-
tions. Prior to the enactment of the 
wrongful death statute, a beneficiary had 
no remedy. Id. at 628, 630, 558 A.2d at 
786,788. Therefore, since the legislature 
created the remedy then it also could 
limit the award. Id. 
Finally, the parents argued that be-
cause the cap limited an "important per-
sonal right," it should be tested underthe 
equal protection analysis using the 
"heightened review" standard. Id. at 632, 
558 A.2d at 789. The court again dis-
agreed, holding that a recovery under a 
wrongful death action is not an "impor-
tant personal right," in that it was only 
created twenty years ago. Id. at 635,558 
A.2d at 790. Instead, the court deter-
mined that the appropriate equal protec-
tion analYSis was the rational basis test. 
Id. at 632, 558 A.2d at 787. Since the 
plaintiffs had not been able to produce 
any persuasive evidence that the statute, 
as applied, was unreasonable or arbi-
trary, the statute was held constitutional. 
Id. at 635, 558 A.2d at 790. 
The court, therefore, concluded that 
section 11-108 of the Md. Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Code Ann. is constitutional as ap-
plied to a wrongful death action. Id. at 
638, 558 A.2d 793. Yet, this is probably 
the first of many state tests to challenge 
the constitutionality of Maryland's cap. 
The holding, however, dealt only with 
the cap as applied to a statutorily created 
action. Thus, although the court implied 
that the cap would be constitutional if 
applied to any personal injury action, the 
issue has yet to be decided. 
-1bomasJ. S. Waxler, III 
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